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RIGHT TO APPELLATE REARGUMENT

In language applicable to courts of appeal, article V,
§ 8(B) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides that
"when a judgment of a district court is to be modified or
reversed and one judge dissents, the case shall be reargued
before a panel of at least five judges prior to rendition of
judgment, and a majority must concur to render judgment."
Despite the broad and apparently mandatory language of this
section, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal has chosen not to
apply it when the dissenting judge disagrees with the majority over issues other than those upon which the reversal or
modification is based.' Additionally, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has mandated application of this provision even when
the cause of action and filing of the suit that is the subject of
the appeal occurred prior to the effective date of the new
constitution. 2 Whether the courts' application of article V, §
8(B), satisfies constitutional requisites while affording maximum judicial efficiency is a question that bears examination.
Federal and common law appellate courts ordinarily may
review only questions of law,3 or mixed questions of law and
fact.4 Federal appellate courts generally may not disturb
findings of fact by the jury or trial judge unless clearly erroneous, 5 or if reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary
verdict. 6 Common law appellate courts generally may not dis1. Murray v. Travelers Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 199, 201 n.5 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975); Brown v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 194, 198 n.4
(La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 204 (La. 1975).
2 Traigle v. P.P.G. Industries, Inc., 315 So. 2d 859, 863 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. granted, 317 So. 2d 625 (La. 1975) (court of appeal's denial of rehearing
vacated; remanded for reargument in compliance with LA. CONST. art. V, §
8(B)); Traigle v. P.P.G. Industries, Inc., 321 So. 2d 541 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975)
(decision after reargument).
3. See, e.g., Delaware & Hudson Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 450 F.2d
603, 620-21 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971); Randolph Constr.
Co. v. Kings East Corp., 334 A.2d 464, 466 (Conn. 1973). See also N.Y. CONST.
art. VI, § 3a, for a state constitutional provision typical in its general limitation of appellate review to questions of law.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S.
520, 526 (1961); Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 329 A.2d 483, 485-86 (Pa. 1974).
5. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 336 U.S. 271,
274-75 (1949), aff'd on rehearing, 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950); Professional Golfers
Ass'n of America v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 672 (5th Cir. 1975);
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
6. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (test
for granting motions for directed verdict).
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turb findings of fact by the jury or trial judge if supported by
the evidence, 7 or by substantial evidence, 8 or unless clearly
erroneous.9 The general federal and common law policy of
limited review of jury or lower court findings of fact mirrors a
determination that witness credibility and the weight of the
evidence are matters best decided by the trier of fact. 10
By contrast, the Louisiana constitution empowers appellate courts to review questions of both law and fact in civil
cases, 1 with the result that civil jury trials in Louisiana
are relatively rare. 1 2 The Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 197313 considered inclusion of appellate review of fact
and ultimately retained the power for various reasons, including its strong civilian heritage,'14 prevention of injustice that
could result in the absence of judicial fact review, 15 and
avoidance of the judicial backlog that could occur from increased demands for civil jury trials' 6 and from lawyers feel7. See, e.g., Chapman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 211 S.E.2d 876, 877 (S.C. 1975);
Home State Bank v. Cavett, 518 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
8. See, e.g., Slater v. Alpha Beta Acme Markets, Inc., 44 Cal. App. 3d 274,
118 Cal. Rptr. 561, 563 (1975); Parsons Mobile Prod., Inc. v. Remmert, 216
Kan; 256, 531 P.2d 428, 432 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Strouth v. Williams, 224 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Minn. 1974); Wolf v.
Wolf, 333 A.2d 138, 139 (R.I. 1975).
10. See, e.g., McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1086 (4th Cir. 1975);
Paradise Ventures, Inc. v. Rossman, 534 P.2d 978, 979 (Ore. 1975).
11. LA. CONST. art. V, §§ 5(C), 10(B). Cf. La. Const. art. VII, §§ 10(6), 29
(1921).
12. See Robertson, The Precedent Value of Conclusions of Fact in Civil
Cases in England and Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 78, 83-84 (1968).
13. STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS, Aug. 5, 1973 at 61-74 [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].

14. Id. at 51, where Delegate Dennis introduced the appellate reargument provision as a "continuation of our present law which is based on
the French civilian tradition of appellate review of the facts." He later remarked: "It would seem strange to me that here in 1973, right after the
advent of 'cajun power' in its full blossom, that we should discard this French
Civilian tradition which has stood us in great stead and made our courts, I
think, the envy of the country." Id. at 72. See also Hubert, Trial by Jury
Under the New Code of Civil Procedure, 35 TUL. L. REV. 520 (1961).
15. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 5 at 65, 67.

16. Id. at 65-67. Delegate Burson expressed concern that abolition of
appellate fact review would increase judicial backlog: "I would agree,
definitely ... that taking away the power of appellate courts to review facts
will increase your backlog many fold. You have only to look at the examples
of the States of Illinois, New York, California and so on where they do not
have appellate review of facts, and they have backlogs of four or five years
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ing compelled to "create" technical errors in order to preserve
some "legal" ground for appeal. 17 As an apparent limitation
upon the capricious exercise of sui generis appellate fact review, the Louisiana jurisprudence has developed the wellestablished rule that a trial court's findings of fact will not be
overturned on appeal unless they are deemed "manifestly
erroneous" by the appellate court."' The "manifest error"
rule appears both a safeguard against subversion of the trial
court's first-hand evaluation of witness demeanor and credibility 19 and an acknowledgement that a major function of an
appellate court is to maintain minimum standards of uni20
formity in the jurisprudence.
The constitutional history of the appellate reargument
provision demonstrates an intent to check unbridled judicial
discretion in the exercise of appellate review of fact 21 combecause everybody wants a jury trial." Id. at 65. Delegate Justice Tate agreed: "[Tihe Institute of Judicial Administration which collects statistics on
delay in Metropolitan and other areas doesn't even list our state because as
bad as we think thedelays are, they are nominal compared to other states.
Chicago five years to wait for a trial in an automobile accident case. New
York the same and so on." Id. at 67.
17. Id. at 67, where Delegate Justice Tate observed: "Now, when your.
review is limited to questions of law, what does a trial lawyer do? Naturally,
he tries to raise, and I don't blame him, just as many technical traps as he
can for the trial court. Why? In order to ...in case he loses, preserve some
ground to have another shot at the apple on a retrial. So what happens?
Instead of a case being tried in one day, it'll be three days. And instead of
being finally over .. .if there are some technical errors there, it's sent back
and it occupies the trial judge again three days."
18. See, e.g., Spreen v. Gibbs, 305 So. 2d 494, 497 (La. 1974); Carter v. New
Orleans Public Service, Inc., 305 So. 2d 481, 485 (La. 1974). For an exhaustive
treatment of the "manifest error" rule, see Comment, Appellate Review of
Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 21 LA. L. REV. 402, 402-15 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Appellate Review]. Louisiana jurisprudence requires for modification
of the amount of damages awarded that an appeals court find that the trial
court abused the "much discretion" allowed the trier of fact under LA. CIV.
CODE art. 1934. See Mayeux v. Mock, 278 So. 2d 591, 592 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1973); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts Jbr the 1974-1975 Term-

Torts, 36 LA. L. REV. 400, 406-08 (1976).
19. For cases suggesting the superior position of the trial judge in observing witness credibility and in determining the weight to be accorded
particular testimony, see Heintz v. Heintz, 231 La. 535, 538-39, 91 So. 2d 784,
786 (1956); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 308 So. 2d 489, 492
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1975). See also Tate, "Manifest Error"-Further Observations on Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 22 LA. L.

REV. 605, 613-14 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Tate].
20. See Tate at 607; Appellate Review at 428-30.
21. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 16 at 56-69.
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parable to the judiciary's self-imposed restraint on its power
through the "manifest error" rule. The Constitution of 1921
placed the determination of whether to sit en banc solely in
the discretion of the courts of appeal. 22 Although the Constitution of 1974 authorizes a court of appeal to sit in panels
of more than three judges, 23 § 8(13) forecloses discretion
when the appeals court reverses or modifies a lower court
decision and one judge dissents from the reversal or modification. Proponents of § 8(B) viewed a compulsory five-judge
appellate panel as a safeguard against overturning of the
trial court's findings of fact by only two of three court of appeal judges relying exclusively on their reading of a "cold"
trial transcript. 24 When an appeals court judge dissents from
reversal or modification of a lower court decision, the judges
having heard the case are evenly divided-two favor reversal
or modification, and two, one of whom observed the witnesses'
demeanor and perceptual capabilities, favor the decree as
rendered.25 Reargument of these cases before a larger panel
of judges was deemed desirable as a matter of policy, especially since the supreme court generally does not grant writs
to review findings of fact in civil cases unless a case concur26
rently presents a question of law or manifest error.
Moreover, proponents urged that the reargument provision
would have the effect of remedying the anomalous situation
in which varying results are reached by the same court of
appeal in nearly identical factual situations, owing to the
appellate court system of rotating the judges in panels of
three.27 Appellate reargument thus appears an explicit curb
on unregulated review of fact by courts of appeal.
22. La. Const. art. VII, § 23 (1921).
23. LA. CONST. art. V, § 8(A). On first hearing, panels of more than three
judges have been utilized in the discretion of the courts of appeal in several
instances. E.g., Rubenstein Bros. v. LaForte, 320 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975); Charbonnet v. Hayes, 318 So. 2d 917 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
24. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 16 at 58, where Delegate Roy, the amendment's
principal proponent, remarked: "All I am saying today is that no two judges
on an appellate court who read a cold record should be able to take what a
district judge has done after hearing a case for three days and subvert it by
simply outvoting another judge."
25. Id. at 56-59. But see id. at 60, where Delegate Tate, arguing against
the provision, noted: "Let's say they split three and two the next time. It is
still three and three. Somewhere there has to be an end to the system."
26. Id. at 60, Delegate Justice Tate remarked: "[T]he policy of the [supreme] court has been on a question of fact not to accept it ... in absence of
a question of law, or manifest injustice."
27. Id. at 57-58.
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Although the broad phraseology of article V, § 8(B) draws
no distinction between issues of fact and issues of law2 8 for
the purpose of appellate reargument, compulsory reargument
when the appeals court, despite a dissenting opinion, reverses
or modifies the lower court's findings of law appears incongruous with constitutional history, which uniformly views
the provision as one designed to vouchsafe the trial court's
determinations of fact.29 Furthermore, reading the provision
literally to require appellate reargument when an appeals
court judge dissents from the majority's reversal or modification of a lower court's findings of law would have the effect of
providing a procedural right beyond that secured by either
federal or common law, 30 and of usurping the function of the
appeals court, which is to guarantee that the 3jurisprudence
1
does not depart from established legal norms.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal decided not to utilize
appellate reargument in Brown v. Employers Commercial
Union Ins. Co. 3 2 because the dissent was directed to the issue
of liability, while the majority's modification of the lower
court's decree involved a reduction of damages. Since, according to constitutional history, § 8(B) provides for appellate re-examination only when a court of appeal splits twoto-one over reversal or modification of a lower court's findings
of fact, the court in Brown appears to have interpreted the
section correctly; the lower court's determination of liability
was neither reversed nor modified, and all appellate judges
acquiesced in the reduction of quantum. 33 To require compliance with the literal terms of the provision whenever one
28. For a discussion of problems encountered in distinguishing issues of
law from issues of fact in Louisiana jurisprudence, see Appellate Review at
412-14.
29. See text beginning at note 21, supra.
30. See text at note 3, supra.
31. See references in note 20, su14pra.
32. 316 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 204 (La.
1975). "[T]he panel is of the unanimous opinion ... [that § 8(B)] is inapplicable
because in the instant case the dissenting opinion addresses itself to the
issue of liability; whereas, the modification of the trial court's judgment by
the majority involves a reduction in quantum." Id. at 198 n.4. See Murray v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 199, 201 n.5 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975) (companion
case; same footnote).
33. Since the dissenting judge would not have held defendant liable at
all, he must have agreed with the majority's reduction of plaintiffs damage
award. 316 So. 2d at 198 (Redmann, J., dissenting).
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judge dissents from reversal or modification on a collateral
matter that is not the basis for the majority's reversal or
modification would be to disregard the constitutional history
of § 8(B), and to ignore the need for swift judicial administration.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal determined in Traigle
v. P.P.G. Industries, Inc.3 4 that article V, § 8(B) was inapplicable when the cause of action and the filing of the suit
that was the subject of appeal antedated the January 1, 1975,
operative date 35 of the Constitution of 1974.36 The court of
appeal cited article XIV, § 23 of the new constitution which
provides that "all . . . suits, . . . appeals, rights or causes of
action, . . . existing on the effective date of this constitution
shall continue unaffected," and article XIV, § 26 which provides that "this constitution shall not be retroactive and shall
not create any right or liability which did not exist under the
Constitution of 1921 based upon actions or matters occurring
prior to the effective date of this constitution." Implicit in the
third circuit's reading of these provisions are the notions that
both substantive and procedural rights bestowed by the new
constitution are non-retroactive and that a litigant's substantive and procedural rights on appeal are those vesting at the
time his cause of action arose. In remanding Traigle on writs
for reargument before a five-judge appellate panel, 37 the supreme court, without articulating its reasons, rejected the
third circuit's interpretation. The supreme court apparently
interprets article V, § 8(B) as having created a new procedural
right, unaffected by the general non-retroactivity rule of arti34. 315 So. 2d 859, 863 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. granted, 317 So. 2d 625 (La.
1975), 321 So. 2d 541 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975) (decision after reargument). See
Fleming v. Maturin, 314 So. 2d 356, 361 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975) (LA. CONST.
art. V, § 8(B) held inapplicable when cause of action, filing of suit and trial
antedated the effective date of the new constitution).
35. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 35.
36. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal has in several other cases declined
to apply LA. CONST. art. V, § 8(B) although the lower court judgment was
reversed or modified and there was a dissent from such alteration, apparently on the same rationale as in Triagle. E.g., Southern Natural Gas Co. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 320 So. 2d 917 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Benoit v. Acadia Fuel &
Distrib., Inc., 315 So. 2d 842 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 550 (La.
1975); Placid Oil Co. v. Taylor, 313 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. granted,
318 So. 2d 40 (La. 1975) (remanded for reargument in compliance with LA.
CONST. art. V, § 8(B)).
37. 317 So. 2d 625 (La. 1975).
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cle XIV, §§ 23 and 26. Since mandatory appellate reargument
does not have application until an appeals court reverses or
modifies a lower court ruling with one judge dissenting from
that reversal or modification, its existence as a procedural
device is wholly contingent on the appellate life of the claim.
Thus, when the appellate life of the claim post-dates the effective date of the constitution, appellate reargument can be
properly viewed as a procedural right to be applied prospectively. The Second and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal evidently have chosen this interpretation of the interrelationship between article V, § 8(B) and article XIV, §§ 23 and
26 38-with the apparent sanction of the supreme court.
The rule is settled in Louisiana that legislation, while it
cannot operate retroactively to divest substantive rights, 39
may apply retrospectively to alter or remedy purely procedural rights.40 Notwithstanding the non-retroactivity principle of article XIV, §§ 23 and 26, reference during the constitutional convention proceedings to § 23 as "standard transitional material,' 4 1 and to § 26 as "absolutely standard language, ' 42 coupled with the absence of any discussion regarding their alteration of the customary retroactivity of laws
affecting procedural rights, suggest these provisions were not
intended as departures from the established substantiveprocedural retroactivity dichotomy. Therefore in situations
like that in Traigle, although substantive rights have vested
38. See, e.g., Magness v. Caddo Parish Police Jury, 318 So. 2d 117 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1975); Rubenstein Bros. v. LaForte, 320 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1975).
39. See, e.g., Long v. Northeast Soil Conservation Dist., 226 La. 824, 833,
77 So. 2d 408, 411 (1954) (by implication); Fithian v. Centanni, 159 La. 831, 838,
106 So. 321, 323 (1925); Town of Eunice v. Childs, 205 So. 2d 897, 900 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 251 La. 937, 207 So. 2d 540 (1968).
40. See, e.g., Fithian v. Centanni, 159 La. 831, 838, 106 So. 321, 323 (1925);
Fullilove v. United States Cas. Co., 129 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961);
Davis v. United Fruit Co., 120 So. 2d 273, 276 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1960). See also
La. Acts 1960, No. 15 § 4(A), enacting statute, which provides that the act
regulated, with some exceptions, procedure in civil actions pending on the
effective date of the act.
41. PROCEEDINGS, Jan. 18 at 51. Delegate Duval noted: "Anyone having
rights which the courts would declare to be vested rights, under the '21
Constitution, their rights would not be taken away-if these rights vest prior
to the adoption of this constitution-is all it's saying." Id. at 54.
42. Id. at 68. Discussion of LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 26 prior to its passage at the constitutional convention occupies merely three pages of the
transcripts. Id. at 68-70.
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prior to the operative date of the new constitution, the former
procedural right to appeal without reargument seems superceded by the article V, § 8(B) appellate reargument provision.
To maintain, in light of the nature and purpose of appellate
reargument, that appellate procedural rights vest at the time
a cause of action arises or at the filing of suit produces
43
anomalous results.
The language and history of Louisiana's unique 4 4 constitutional provision indicate that appellate reargument before a five-judge panel should be automatic in its operation;
rehearing should ensue without any requirement that the
litigant petition for it. After a three-judge appellate panel
considers the merits of a case at its appeals court conference,
a split decision favoring reversal or modification of a lower
court's findings of fact should ipso facto require reargument
before a five-judge panel prior to rendition of written judg45
ment.
Appellate reargument likely will be utilized infrequently
since only a small proportion of cases decided by the Louisiana courts of appeal involve reversal or modification of a
lower court's findings of fact and a dissent from the reversal or modification, 46 perhaps in part because of the
43. For instance, in a suit for breach of contract in which the cause of
action arose December 31, 1974, an appeals court would not apply the appellate reargument provision, though the action might not be brought for several years because of the ten year prescriptive period for causes of action in
contract (LA. CIV. CODE art. 3544); however, that same court would be required to apply appellate reargument on appeal of the same suit if the cause
of action arose January 1, 1975, merely one day later.
44. Research has revealed no other state constitutional provision requiring appellate reargument; this is not surprising since no other state
provides for appellate review of fact. See text at note 6, supra. But cf. N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 3b(1), which provides in civil cases an appeal of right to the
Court of Appeals from judgments entered upon the decision of an appellate
division of the supreme court when at least one of the justices dissents from
the decision, or when the judgment reverses or modifies the trial court's
judgment.
45. For proper application of appellate reargument-automatically and
prior to rendition of written judgment, see, e.g., Succession of Hausser, 320
So. 2d 614 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Board of Comm'rs v. Elmer, 318 So. 2d 914
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Townsend v. Cleve Hey! Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 318
So. 2d 618 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
46. The writer's research of the Southern Reporters from Volume 306
(the first volume recording Louisiana court of appeal decisions rendered after
January 1, 1975), through the recent Volume 320 revealed that in only about
3.7% of all cases decided by the Louisiana courts of appeal during this
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thoroughness of appeals court conferences. 47 Nonetheless,
when article V, § 8(B) is applicable, the favored position accorded lower court findings of fact by the Constitution of 1974
should guide the courts of appeal in their review of trial court
determinations. Ideally, increased judicial sensitivity to the
need for delicately balancing first-hand trial court findings of
fact with the economics and equity of appellate review of fact
will be the product of mandatory appellate reargument.
Joseph S. Palermo, Jr.
DUE PROCESS FOR DRIVERS UNDER THE LOUISIANA
REVOCATION STATUTES

With the recent demise of the right-privilege distinction
in procedural due process analysis,' the United States Supreme Court is declaring state statutory schemes invalid
2
under the fourteenth amendment with increasing frequency.
The parameters of liberty and property interests and the
procedures required of the state to protect them are expanding to match increasing governmental power. The purpose of this note is to determine whether the Louisiana
scheme for revocation and suspension of drivers' licenses has
3
kept apace with these constitutional developments.
interval (in about 30 of approximately 800 cases) was there a reversal or
modification of a lower court's findings coupled with a dissent from the
reversal or modification.
47. This rationale was suggested by Judge Landry in a conversation the
writer had with the senior judge of the First Circuit Court of Appeal on
December 18, 1975.
1. E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) ("[T]he Court
has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and
'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due
process rights."); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). Formerly, many states labeled statutorily permitted activities as "privileges" on the theory that what the state
gives it may take away without due process.
2. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (Ohio high school student
suspension statute).

3. Only LA. R.S. 32:414 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 508 § 1,
and LA. R.S. 32:661-69 (Supp. 1972), as amended [hereinafter cited as the
Implied Consent Law], will be considered in this note. Other statutes providing for revocation or suspension, such as LA. R.S. 32:415 (1950) (commission of
an offense in another jurisdiction which would be grounds for revocation or

